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Virtual Reality 
The Interplay Between Technology, Ontology and Art
Höher als die Wirklichkeit steht die Möglichkeit.
Introduction
In  th e ir m illennia-old  histories art and technology have always been  closely 
related . It has often  been  p o in ted  ou t that the Greeks used the same word -  
techne -  for craft an d  a rt an d  called the craftsm an and  the artist by the same 
nam e: technites. Like the  craftsm an, the artist in his creation  is d ep en d en t 
on  (th e  m astery of) specific tools. Even the prehistoric artist d ep en d ed  on 
specific technical knowledge (for exam ple the reddening  o f yellow pigments 
fo u n d  in the cave by b u rn in g  them ), and  m ade use o f ingenious tools to 
engrave an d  p a in t figures on  the cave walls. A lthough since G reek culture 
a r t an d  techno logy  have gradually gone their separate ways, the m odern  
a r tis t  is obv iously  n o  less d e p e n d e n t  on  tech n o lo g ica l tools th an  his 
p reh is to ric  predecessor. We m ight even say that artists today, extensively 
using photography, film, synthesisers, samplers and  com puters as their tools, 
are  even m ore than  ever d ep en d en t on technology. This is especially obvious 
in the case o f virtual reality. It has even been  suggested tha t in virtual reality 
(VR) a r t an d  techno logy  are com ing back together again (P im entel and  
T eixeira  1993, 229). As M ichael H eim  states in his book  The Metaphysics of 
Virtual Reality: »Perhaps the essence ofV R  ultim ately lies n o t in technology 
b u t in art, p erh ap s a rt o f  the h ighest order. R ather than  control or escape 
o r  e n te r ta in  o r  co m m u n ic a te , th e  u ltim a te  p ro m ise  o f  VR m ay be to 
transform , to redeem  o u r awareness o f reality -  som ething that the highest 
a r t has a ttem p ted  to do  an d  som ething h in ted  at in the  very label virtual 
reality, a label tha t has stuck, despite all objections, and that sums up a century 
o f  technological innovations« (Heim  1993, 124).
In  o rd e r to e lucidate  the ontological dim ension o f a rt and technology 
th a t H eim  is aim ing  at, it is w orth recalling H eidegger’s rem ark on techne in 
The Origin o f the Work of Art. A lthough H eidegger adm its that the reference 
to the G reek practice o f calling craft and  art by the same nam e is convincing 
to a certain  ex ten t, he  im m ediately adds that this reference rem ains oblique
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and  superficial. According to H eidegger the G reek techne signifies n e ith e r  
craft n o r art, and  certainly n o t technicality in the present-day sense. In G reek 
culture techne doesn ’t m ean a kind o f practical perfo rm ance , b u t ra th e r  a 
m ode o f knowing: »For G reek th o u g h t the n a tu re  o f  know ing consists in 
aletheia, th a t  is, in the  u n covering  o f  beings. I t su p p o rts  an d  g u id es  all 
com portm ent toward beings. Techne, as knowledge experienced  in the G reek 
m anner, is a bringing forth  o f beings in th a t it brings forth  p re sen t beings as 
such beings out o/concealedness and  specifically into the  unconcealedness 
o f their appearance; techne never signifies the  action o f  m aking« (H eidegger 
1975, 59). C onsidered from  the p o in t o f  view o f m o d ern  aesthetics, w hich 
strongly em phasises the role o f artis t’s orig inality  a n d  au th en tic ity  in the  
» b rin g in g  fo r th  o f  b e in g s« , H e id e g g e r  in  th is  s ta te m e n t  see m s to  
underestim ate the artist’s con tribu tion  to the realisa tion  o f the  w ork o f  art. 
However, tru e  as this may be, H eidegger rightly poin ts a t a d im en sio n  o f 
the work o f art that, ju s t because o f the  m o d ern  em phasis on  the  creative 
artist, has been  largely neglected  in m o d ern  aesthetics: the  fact th a t a work 
o f art discloses a  world. This disclosure o f a w orld by a w ork o f  a r t is n o t a 
kind of representation, bu t ra ther an evocation: »A building, a G reek tem ple, 
portrays noth ing . It simply stands in the m iddle o f  the rock-cleft valley. T h e  
build ing encloses the figure o f the god, and  in this co n cea lm en t lets it stand  
out into the holy precinct through the open  portico. By m eans o f  the tem ple, 
the god is p resen t in the tem ple. This p resence o f  the  god  is in  itself the 
extension an d  delim itation  o f the p rec in c t as a holy p recinct. T h e  tem ple 
and  its p recinct, however, do  n o t fade away in to  th e  in d efin ite . I t is th e  
tem plework that first fits together and  at the sam e tim e gathers a ro u n d  itself 
the unity o f those paths and  relations in which b irth  an d  dea th , d isaster and  
blessing, victory and disgrace, en d u ran ce  and  dec line  acqu ire  the  shape o f  
destiny for hum an  being. T he all-governing expanse o f this op en  re la tiona l 
con tex t is the world o f this historical people« (H eidegger 1975, 42).
In  o r d e r  to  u n d e r s ta n d  th e  in t im a te  r e la t io n s h ip  b e tw e e n  th e  
ontological ‘w orking’ o f a rt and  technology, it is necessary to consider the 
fact that the way a work o f a rt discloses a w orld ca n n o t be isolated from  the 
technologies used in the d ifferen t artistic disciplines. T h e  way a w ork o f  
arch itectu re (like the G reek tem ple m en tio n ed  by H eidegger) discloses a 
world, differs essentially from  the way this hap p en s in  a pain ting , a tragedy, 
a dance o r in a piece o f music. But even works w ithin o n e  artistic discip line 
can have quite d ifferen t m odes o f disclosure. An exam ple taken from  the 
visual arts may e lucidate  this. T h e  way V an G o g h ’s p a in tin g  o f  a p a ir o f  
peasant shoes (a second exam ple H eidegger m en tions in  his text) discloses 
a world, is essentially d ifferen t to the  way this h ap p en s in a p h o to g rap h  o r
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in a digitally synthesised im age o f a pair o f  shoes. T hese th ree  d iffe ren t 
tech n iq u es  o f tw o-dim ensional rep resen ta tio n  express d iffe ren t im plicit 
on to logies o r w orld views an d  as such are p art o f th ree  succeeding epochs 
in th e  history o f (th e  u n d erstan d in g  of) Being (cf. De Mul 1997).
In my co n trib u tio n  I w ant to break  som e ground for an analysis o f how 
artw orks th a t m ake use o f VR technology disclose worlds in their own way. 
I will p re sen t my analysis o f  the im plicit ontology of VR along the axes o f 
technology, ontology and  art. T ogether these three axes enable us to develop 
a d ee p e r insight in the  essence o f VR.1
Technology
From  a sh ee r technological po in t o f view, virtual reality (also known 
as virtual environm ents, artificial reality, virtual space, o r immersive m edia) 
can  sim ply be described  as the m ost recen t offshoot o f the  developm ent o f 
(ever m ore  user-friendly) m an-com puter interfaces.2 It can be defined as »a
1 Obviously I do no t claim  tha t these three axes offer a com plete understanding o f the 
natu re  of VR. Like any o ther technology, VR is the result o f a com plex interplay of 
various technical, scientific, military, socio-economic, (sub) cultural, ideological and 
philosophical factors. Far from being an isolated domain, VR (especially in its networked 
variants: v irtua l a g o ra ’s, m alls and  com m unities) is p art o f a b ro ad e r  societal 
developm ent tha t is characterized by a decline of urban com m unal space and the 
infiltration of the life-world and society with virtual technologies like television, radio, 
video, portable stereos and m obile telephones (Ostwald 1997, 126-7) and is strongly 
supported  by the em ergence o f ‘inform ational capitalism’ (Castells 1996, 361, 366). 
Many au thors have po in ted  at the m ale-gendered, North-Atlantic and colonialist 
ideology of many VR-applications or even of VR technology as such (Dietrich 1997; 
Hayles 1996; K ram arae 1995; Penny 1994; Stone 1995; Vasseleu 1997; Wise 1997). 
M oreover, as has already been suggested in my introduction, VR is the (tentative) 
culm ination  of a specific trad ition  of artistic representation , in which the central 
perspective from  Renaissance painting, the realism of photography, the immersion of 
panoram as and the movement of film are combined (Hayward and Wollen 1993; Penny 
1994). O thers have po in ted  at the strong  influences of sub-cultures such as the 
psychedelic counter-culture of the sixties, the successive popular music cultures from 
rock to house with their accompanying audiovisual practices, New Age mysticism and 
science fiction, especially of the cyberpunk that originated in William Gibsons 1984 
novel Neuromancer, in which the idea of ‘jacking in ’ to cyberspace, as well as the term  
‘c y b e rsp a c e ’ was in tro d u c e d  (H ayw ard 1993; Ziguras 1997). M oreover, the 
development of VR is characterized by the dualism of an important tradition in Western 
religion and philosophy, represented by Plato, Christianity and Descartes. (Heim 1993, 
83-108; Penny 1994).
2 The term  ‘virtual reality’ was introduced in 1989 by the computer-aided design software
com pany Autodesk and the eclectic com puter company VPL and becam e a ‘h o t’ topic
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th ree-d im ensional, co m p u te r g en e ra ted , s im u la ted  e n v iro n m e n t th a t is 
ren d ered  in real time according to the behav iour o f  the user« (L oeffler an d  
A nderson 1994, x i) . As such it succeeds the  tw o-dim ensional graphical user 
interface o f the M acintosh and W indows o p era tio n  systems, ju s t  as this two- 
dim ensional interface replaced the one-dim ensional com m and-line p ro m p t 
o f  DOS, U nix  an d  o th e r  early systems. W hereas in  th e  case o f  DOS you 
remove a file from  your com puter by typing in  the co m m an d  ‘d e le te ’ and  
in the case o f a M acintosh o r a W indows co m p u te r you do  this by d ragg ing  
a two-dimensional represen ta tion  o f  this file with the he lp  o f  your m ouse to 
a two-dimensional represen ta tion  o f a w astepaper basket, in the  case o f  a 
VR interface you take up  a th ree-dim ensional rep resen ta tio n  o f  the  file in 
your h an d  and throw  it in the virtual basket n ex t to your chair.
A lthough VR is still in its infancy, th e  th ree  e lem en ts th a t to g e th e r 
constitu te the VR-experience are already p re sen t in the c u rre n t VR systems 
(cf. Aukstakalnis and Blatner 1992, 23; Lavroff 1992,9-13). T he first e lem en t 
is immersion. In a VR system the  u se r is n o t m ere ly  o b serv in g  th e  d a ta  
p re sen ted  by the co m p u te r th ro u g h  a w indow , b u t  is e x p e rie n c in g  an 
alternate  reality from  the inside. In  the p re sen t VR-systems th e  ex p erien ce  
o f im m ersion is mostly evoked by the  use o f a h ead -m o u n ted  display, with 
binocular parallax displays and stereo earphones to create 3-D optical effects 
and  sound. In still experim ental VR systems laser ligh t is u sed  to p ro jec t 
images im mediately on  the retina. Even m ore experim ental are the attem pts 
to co n n ec t the com pu ter im m ediately to the  b ra in  in o rd e r to evoke the  
im ages an d  sounds (an d  p erh ap s also tactile  an d  o lfac to ry  sen sa tio n s) 
electronically. VR systems share the e lem en t o f im m ersion with o lder m odes 
o f re p resen ta tio n  like the  p an o ram a  o r th em e  p a rk  a ttra c tio n s  such  as 
StarTours in Disneyland Paris.
T he second elem ent of the VR experience, which distinguishes VR from  
these o ld er m odes o f rep resen ta tion , is navigation. N avigation is the  ability 
to m ove ab o u t in  the  co m p u te r-g en e ra ted  e n v iro n m e n t. W h ereas in  a 
trad itional p anoram a and  in D isneyland’s S tarT ours th e  p o sition  o f the  
viewer is fixed, in the case of VR the ‘visitor’ can navigate th ro u g h  the virtual 
env ironm en t and view it from  d ifferen t perspectives. This is m ade possible
in the m edia soon afterwards. However, the technology itself has a somewhat longer 
history. From  1969 onwards, the artist Myron Krueger developed a series of multi- 
sensory environments, that could in teract with the visitor by using pressure-sensitive 
floorpads and infrared lights and which he called artificial reality. The head-m ounted 
displays built by Ivan Sutherland, also in the late 1960s, were the first precursors to 
current VR-systems and were further developed in military and aerospace applications 
in the 1970s and 1980s and in the game industry in the 1990s (Chester s.q.; Coyle 1993).
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by (m ech an ica l, u ltra so n ic , m agnetic , o r  optical) p o s it io n /o r ie n ta tio n  
track ing  devices in  the  ou tfit o f the cybernaut that instruct the com puter, 
w hich p a r t o f  the en v iro n m en t to display w hen the user moves his body o r 
his head . O f course, navigation by the  user only goes as far as th e  com pu ter 
p rog ram  allows. You can only explore locations that are pre-program m ed 
an d  sto red  in  the c o m p u te r’s memory.
T h e  th ird  and  perh ap s m ost innovative elem ent o f VR, com pared  to 
all fo rego ing  types o f rep resen ta tion , is that it allows the user to interact with 
the  virtual env ironm ent. This m eans that the user, thanks to in p u t devices 
such as datagloves o r datasuits, can m anipulate the objects in  the  virtual 
env iro n m en t which resp o n d  appropriately. M oreover, virtual agents can act 
u p o n  th e  user, o r  b e tte r: o n  the representation o f the  u ser (these ‘virtual 
b o d ies’ a re  usually called ‘ava tars’or ‘p erso n ae’). In instances w here m ore 
th an  o n e  u ser is sim ultaneously  im m ersed in the virtual env ironm en t, it 
becom es a sh ared  w orld, in  w hich their avatars can also in te rac t with each 
other. In the popular arcade game Dactyl Nightmare™, for example, the players 
try to accum ulate  as m any points as possible by shooting a t and  h ittin g  the 
avatar o f  th e  o th e r players. In do ing  so, they are constantly th rea ten ed  by a 
virtual pterodactyl, w hich attem pts to pick up  these avatars and  kill them  by 
d ro p p in g  them  dow n.3
As the (alm ost) real tim e rendering  o f images and  sounds requires very 
pow erful processors and  a huge storage capacity, m ost VR systems today are 
im plem ented  in specially designed and  therefore very expensive stand-alone 
com pu ters. H owever, in p rin c ip le  VR can be im p lem en ted  in  co m p u te r 
networks as well. In te restin g  exam ples are virtual worlds such as Alphaworld, 
w hich are em erg ing  on  the  In ternet. A lthough these virtual worlds (still) 
lack the  e lem en t o f  full im m ersion  (the inhab itan t m erely looks at them  
th ro u g h  his co m p u te r ‘w indow ’), they enable the ‘in h ab itan t’ to navigate 
th ro u g h  this en v iro n m en t with the help  o f his avatar, cultivate his virtual 
estate, an d  in te rac t w ith o th e r inhabitants. In these virtual worlds the  users 
a re  n o t  on ly  v isiting  a p re -co n s tru c te d  en v iro n m en t, b u t b eco m e  the  
(intuitive) co-program m ers o f this environm ent, too.
T h e  env ironm en ts VR technology gives access to are n o t necessarily 
com pletely  virtual. I t is also possible to mix them  with ‘rea l’ environm ents. 
This h ap p en s fo r exam ple in augm ented  reality and  telepresence systems. 
An exam ple o f an  au g m en ted  reality system is the h elm et o f a p ilo t w here 
add itional in fo rm ation  ab o u t the env ironm ent is displayed on the  inside. 
T he p ilo t finds him self situated in a multi-layered environm ent that com bines
3 F or a m o re  d e ta iled  p h en o m en o lo g ica l descrip tion  o f the  ex p e rien ce  Dactyle 
Nightman?™ see (Green 1997).
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virtual an d  real elem ents. In  the case o f  te lep resen ce  systems, the  h ead - 
m o u n ted  display and  datagloves o r da tasu it a re  co n n ec ted  with a ro b o t in 
ano ther real location, which acts as the avatar. T he user perceives the  rem ote  
env ironm en t with the help  of the ‘senses’ o f the robo t, an d  uses th e  ro b o t’s 
‘lim bs’ to navigate th rough  this location an d  to in te rac t with the th ings he  
finds there . This way a firem an could  virtually go in to  a b u rn in g  h ouse  to 
rescue its in h ab itan t or a scientist co u ld  virtually walk o n  M ars o r m ove 
betw een m olecules. VR, augm ented  reality an d  te lep recense  can be m ixed  
in a n u m b er o f ways. H ans Moravec o f the  Robotics In stitu te  o f  C arnegie 
M ellon University, for exam ple, im agines a hybrid  system w here a virtual 
‘cen tral s ta tio n ’ is su rrounded  by portals th a t o p en  on  to views o f m ultip le  
real locations. W hile in the station one  inhab its a virtual body, b u t w hen 
one  steps th ro u g h  a portal, the harness link  is seamlessly sw itched from  the 
sim ulation to a telepresence robo t waiting at th a t location  (M oravec 1995).
In som e respects VR itself m ight be called a virtual technology. O n  the 
one hand, the systems available a t p resen t are  still far from  being  a  realisation 
o f the prom ises and  dream s o f their bu ilders and  savants. A lthough  we may 
expect th a t VR technology will show im pressive im provem ents in the  n ex t 
decades, som e o f the prom ises and  dream s p ro jec ted  in VR will certain ly  
rem ain  virtual forever, as they are based on  an in ad eq u a te  u n d ers tan d in g  
o f VR. O n the o th er hand , VR is a virtual technology in the  sense th a t we do  
n o t yet seem  to grasp its u n ique potentials. VR still is in  search  o f  its own 
distinguishing ‘g ram m ar’. We m ight com pare  this s ituation  to th a t o f  film 
in its formative years. Only with the invention  o f m on tage d id  film acqu ire  
the specific gram m ar that has m ade it a u n iq u e  way o f disclosing the w orld. 
As in the early days o f  film -  consider V ertov’s M an with the Camera — m any 
artists today are investigating this ontological d im ension  o f VR in th e ir work 
(see Loeffler and  A nderson 1994; M oser and  M acLeod 1996).
A lthough we can n o t p red ic t th e  fu tu re  d ev e lo p m en t o f  VR, we can 
tentatively explore its ontological po tentials by studying the  way the p re sen t 
VR systems disclose a world. In addition, this will enable us to consider som e 
o f the im plications of VR as an artistic m edium .
Ontology
P rior to my analysis o f the ontology o f virtual reality, I have to say a 
few words abou t the m eaning  o f the w ord ‘on to logy’. I use this w ord in  the 
sense it was in tro d u ced  by H eidegger in Sein und  Zeit (H e id eg g er 1979, 
hereafte r cited as SuZ). O ntology has to do  with the B eing o f beings, th a t is:
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the way beings ap p ear to us, hum an  beings (or, in H eidegger’s terminology: 
h u m an  Dasein, a  term  th a t indicates the awareness of Being that characterizes 
h u m an  ex is ten ce). This n o tio n  o f ontology p resupposes an ontological 
d i f f e re n c e  b e tw e e n  (o n  th e  o n tic  level) in d iv id u a l beings, th a t  a re  
in d e p e n d e n t o f th e  ex p e rien ce  by w hich they are disclosed (e.g. rocks, 
com pu ters, trees, anim als, hum ans, gods), and  their (ontological) Being, 
w hich ‘is’ only  in  the  u n d ers tan d in g  o f these beings by m an (SuZ 183). 
A lthough beings are in d ep en d e n t o f hum an  existence in the sense that they 
are n o t co n stitu ted  by the  h um an  subject -  and  for th a t reason Heidegger, 
con trary  to H usserl, m igh t be called a ‘herm eneu tic  realist’ (Dreyfus 1991, 
255) - ,  th e ir Being is not. For that reason H eidegger in Sein und, Zeit regards 
the  analysis o f h u m an  existence as the fundam ental ontology on which all 
reg ional ontologies (o f n a tu re , history, art, etc.) are grounded.
Probably this clarification o f the ontological difference between beings 
an d  th e ir  Being, an d  the  re la ted  analysis o f the  problem s o f trad itional 
ontology th a t result from  the neglect o f this difference are H eidegger’s most 
im p o rtan t con tribu tions to philosophy. In traditional ontology Being and 
h um an  beings (Dasein) were mainly conceived o f as if they were beings. Being 
was conceived o f as the h ighest being and  g round  o f all o th er beings (e.g. 
the Idea o f the G ood in P lato’s philosophy or God in the Christian tradition). 
A nd h u m an  being  was also considered  from  the perspective o f beings as a 
being  with specific characteristics that could be determ ined. Contrary to this 
view H eidegger argues th a t h um an  existence is a concernful Being-in-the- 
W orld. Dasein is n o t the isolated ego, which Descartes described, bu t is always 
already bodily in the world, dealing with the beings it encounters there. In 
this con tex t the co n cep t ‘W orld ’ is n o t an ontic term  referring  to the totality 
o f beings, b u t an onto logical concept, po in ting  towards the (no t necessary 
explicit) m eaningful totality of relationships between Dasein and the available 
(zuhanden) be ings. W o rld  is n o t an  o b jec t o pposite  to a subject, b u t a 
s tru c tu ra l asp ec t o f  Dasein. C orrespondingly , o th e r persons are  p art o f 
Dasein ’s Being-in-the-W orld too. Dasein ’s being is a B eingW ith and  its W orld 
is a com m on env ironm en ta l whole (SuZ, 120).
This concernful and bodily Being-in-theW orld with others has a specific 
tem poral an d  spatial structure. Dasein is n o t in time like, for example, a rock; 
it is tem poral in the sense tha t is a project that is always pressed forward into 
fu tu re  possibilities. Dasein is a Seinkönnen, a potentiality  to be (Möglichkeit). 
A t th e  sam e tim e th e se  p o ssib ilitie s  a re  n o t  in f in ite  in  n u m b e r, b u t 
d e te rm in e d  by the situation  Dasein is always already in, the throumness or 
facticity o f his existence. Dasein’s spatiality canno t be understood  as simply 
having a location w ithin an  objective space am ong o th e r beings. Spatiality
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ra th e r is a function  o f bodily Being-in-the-W orld: »Only to  the ex ten t th a t 
beings are revealed for Dasein in th e ir dis-stancedness, d o  ‘rem o ten esses’ 
and  distances with regard  to o th er things becom e accessible in intraw orldly 
beings them selves« (SuZ 105).4 F rom  th e  p e rsp ec tiv e  o f  H e id e g g e r ’s 
fundam ental ontology objective time an d  space as they are conceived in the 
natural sciences are deficient m odes o f the tem poral an d  spatial s tru c tu re  
o f Dasein's concernful Being-in-the-W orld.5
W hat I wish to argue h ere  is th a t H e id eg g er’s fu n d am en ta l on to logy  
can help  us in o u r a ttem pt to grasp the onto logical d im ension  o f VR. I t can 
help  us u n d erstan d  VR as a specific m ode o f  Dasein s bodily Being-in-the- 
W orld , w ith  a spec ific  te m p o ra l a n d  sp a tia l s tru c tu re .  I h av e  to  a d d  
immediately, however, that the analysis in Sein und Zeit also raises two serious 
obstacles to this attem pt. In the first place H eidegger in  Sein und Zeit, in  spite 
o f his em phasis o f the tem porality o f Dasein, seems to p re sen t the existential 
structure o f Dasein as a timeless structu re , leaving hard ly  any ro o m  fo r an  
analysis o f alternative m odes o f Being-in-the-W orld o th e r  th an  d e fic ien t 
modes. In  the second place, in Sein und Zeit H eidegger, a lthough  extensively 
exam ining the  role o f instrum ents such as ham m ers in  Dasein’s d isclosure 
o f W orld, barely pays a tten tion  to modem  technology. O n e  m igh t w on d er 
w hether the work o f H eidegger after his fam ous Kehre is n o t b e tte r eq u ip p ed  
for this task, because here  the tem porality  (th a t is: th e  epochal charac te r) 
of the understand ing  of Being as well as the role o f m o d ern  technology plays 
a p ro m in en t role. However, the fact th a t in this la te r w ork -  fo r reasons I 
canno t deal with here  -  the em phasis also moves from  the projectivity o f 
existence to the thrownness (now conceived o f as Ge-schick), the la te r work 
prevents us from  grasping the projective charac te r o f VR. T h ere fo r I suggest 
to approach VR from the projective perspective o f the fundam ental ontology 
o f  Sein u n d  Zeit w ith  a s im u lta n e o u s  a t te n t io n  fo r  th e  e p o c h a l  a n d  
technological dim ension o f Being-in-the-W orld. W hat is n eed ed , then , is a 
phenom enological description and in terp re ta tio n  o f the  d ifferen t structural 
aspects o f Dasein’s Being-in-a-virtual-W orld, such as v irtual em b o d im en t, 
virtual Being-With, the spatial and  tem pora l s tructu re  o f virtual w orlds and  
their specific worldliness.6
4 »Das Zuhandene des altäglichen Umgangs hat den Character der Nähe. Genau besehen 
ist diese N ähe des Zeugs in dem  T erm in u s , d e r  se in  Sein  au sd ru c k t, in  d en  
‘Z uhandenheit’ schon angedeutet. Das ‘zur H an d ’ Seiende h a tje  eine V erschiedene 
Nähe, die sich nicht durch Ausmessen von A bständen festgelegt ist. Diese N ähe regelt 
sich aus dem  umsichtig ‘berechnenden’ H antieren  und  G ebrauchen« (SuZ 102).
5 F or a m ore de ta iled  exposition  o f H e id e g g e r’s fu n d a m e n ta l on to logy  see my 
forthcom ing book The Tragedy ofFinitude (De Mul 1999b).
* In his H eidegger inspired analysis of the ontology of digital dom ains C hester states
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As I in tend  to elucidate the way VR-artworks disclose World, I will mainly 
focus on  the spatial an d  tem poral s tructu re and  the ‘w orldliness’ o f virtual 
w orlds, an d  will only rem ark  on  o th er aspects in passing. W ith regard  to 
the  way VR affects Being-in-the-W orld § 23 o f Sein und Zeit provides us with 
a c lue . In  th e  c o n te x t o f  th e  spatial d im en sio n  o f B eing-in-the-W orld, 
H e id eg g er em phasises th a t Dasein is characterized by a typical tendency to 
nearness (»eine wesenhafte Tendenz a u f Nähe«), He rem arks: »All the ways in 
w hich we speed  u p  things, as we are m ore o r less com pelled  to do today, 
p u sh  us on  tow ards th e  co n q u e s t o f  rem oteness. W ith  the  ‘ra d io ’, for 
ex am p le , Dasein has so e x p a n d e d  its everyday e n v iro n m e n t th a t it has 
accom plished  an  expansion  and  devastation o f the everyday ‘w orld’ -  a de­
severance w hich, in its m ean in g  for Dasein, can n o t yet be  visualised« (SuZ 
105). H e idegger talks ab o u t a devastation ( Zerstörung) o f  the everyday world 
because the  rad io  d isorders the relationship  between physical and  hum an 
nearness. A voice we h e a r on  the radio o r on  the te lephone can be nearer 
to us than  the receiver. In  the case o f immersive, navigational and  interactive 
tech n o lo g ies  such  as VR an d  te lep resence  the  n o tio n s o f  nearness and  
rem oteness u n d erg o  an  even m ore radical expansion an d  devastation.
At the  ontic level netw orked VR and telepresence-technology are, like 
the  rad io  an d  te lep h o n e , p a rt o f the process o f globalization, tha t is: »the 
com pressing  o f tim e an d  o f tim e costs in relation to spatial displacem ent, as 
well as the  m ean in g  an d  effects o f such displacem ent« (B insbergen 1997, 
2). Because o f the specific p roperties o f the ea rth ’s surface and  the mobility 
o f homo sapiens, we m ay say th a t the global d isp lacem ent o f people, ideas 
an d  goods is as old  as hum anity  itself. From  an ontological p o in t o f  view we 
m igh t add  tha t this process o f  globalization ultimately is g rounded  in Dasein’s 
ten d en cy  to nearn ess an d  de-severance. However, in  the age o f m odern  
technology  this process shows a striking acceleration and  radicalization. As 
the cu ltura l an th ropo log ist Van B insbergen states it: »W hen messages travel 
a t the speed  o f ligh t across the globe using electronic m edia, when therefore 
physical d isp lacem ent is hardly needed  for effective com m unication yet such
th a t the spatial m e tap h o rs  to d eno ta te  digital dom ains (like the m etaphors of 
cyberspace, desktop, and  E lectronic Superhighway) are misleading, because these 
dom ains are no t spatial a t all. He is certainly right in asserting that com puters rather 
elim inate space by »encoding logical and physical entities as symbolic, addressable 
signs« (Chester 1997). However, as he notices himself, in o rd er to function within a 
hum an context, com puters no t only have devices to convert the spatial analogue to 
the  non-spatial digital (keyboards, mice etc.), bu t also devices to  reconstitute the 
analogue (screens, display’s, speakers). A lthough digital dom ains are no t spatial 
themselves, from  the perspective of Dasdn, the immersion in a digital domain certainly 
has a spatial character.
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d isp lacem ent can be effected within o n e  o r two days from  anyw here o n  the 
globe to anyw here else, and  w hen the  techno logy  o f m an u fac tu rin g  and  
distribution has developed to such levels tha t the same m aterial env ironm ent 
using the same objects can be created  an d  fitted  o u t anyw here o n  the globe 
at will -  th en  we have reduced  the fees th a t tim e an d  space im pose on  the 
social p rocess, to  v irtually  zero« (B in sb e rg e n  1997, 3). In  th e  age o f  
in fo rm a tio n  and  co m m u n ica tio n  tech n o lo g y , especially  in  th e  case o f 
telepresence and netw orked VR, Dasein ’s tendency  to nearness u n d erg o es a 
radical change, which has no  less radical on to logical im plications.
L et m e first elucidate this by a closer exam ination  o f b o th  constituen ts 
o f the phrase ‘virtual reality’, starting  with the n o tio n  o f ‘reality ’. As no ticed  
before, H eidegger criticises trad itional ontology for u n d ers ta n d in g  W orld  
and  Being from  the perspective o f intraw orldly beings. In  m o d ern  ontology 
since Descartes being is conceived from  the perspective o f substantiality, and  
th e  w o rld  as a to ta lity  o f  th in g s  th a t  a re  o c c u re n t  (» v o rh a n d e n d e r  
D ingzusam m enhang (res)«) (SuZ 201). From  the perspective o f  fundam ental 
ontology, however, Being (not beings) is d e p e n d e n t on  o u r u n d erstan d in g , 
which m eans that reality (no t the real) is d e p e n d e n t on  co n cern fu l Being- 
in-the-W orld (SuZ 212). This im plies th a t d iffe ren t in te rp re ta tive  practices 
can reveal d ifferen t aspects o f natu re . From  this p o in t o f  view one ca n n o t 
say, for exam ple, » that the Galilean d o c trin e  o f  freely falling bod ies is true  
and  tha t A ristotle’s teaching, th a t ligh t bodies strive upw ard, is false; fo r the 
G reek und erstan d in g  o f the essence o f body an d  place an d  o f  the  re la tion  
betw een the two rests upon  a d iffe ren t in te rp re ta tio n  o f en tities an d  hence  
conditions a correspondingly d ifferen t k ind  o f seeing  an d  q uestion ing  o f 
natu ra l events« (H eidegger 1977, 117). In  the  co n tex t o f  my sub ject the 
crucial question is: how is reality in te rp re ted  an d  revealed by Dasein th ro u g h  
virtual reality?
This brings us to the word ‘v irtual’ in the  expression  ’virtual reality ’. 
T he etymology o f this term  offers an  im p o rtan t clue as to why, am o n g  o th e r 
candidates, this particular label for this new technology has stuck. T h e  words 
‘v irtual’ and  ‘virtuality’ are derived from  the Latin  virtualis. »N on-existent 
in classical Latin (although obviously inspired  by the word virtus th e re ), they 
are late-m edieval neologism s, w hose in v en tio n  b ecam e necessary  w hen, 
partly via Arabic versions o f A ristotle’s works, his G reek  co n cep t o f dynamis 
( ‘potentiality, power, q u ad ra te ’) h ad  to be  transa lted  in to  L atin  (H o en en  
1947, 326n; Little, Fowler, and  C oulson 1978, s.v. ‘v irtual’)« (B insbergen 
1997, 9). After the decline o f A ristotelian philosophy these concep ts fo u n d  
refuge in the expanding field o f physics. A round 1700 these concepts becam e 
established concepts in optics in the theory  o f the ‘virtual im age’: the objects
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show n in a m irro r im age, th a t do n o t really exist, b u t are m erely illusory 
rep resen ta tio n s, w hich we apparan tly  observe a t the e n d  o f the refrac ted  
ligh t beam s co n n ectin g  the object, the surface o f the m irro r, and ou r eye. A 
cen tu ry  later, th e  concep ts becam e established in m echanics in theories 
ab o u t v irtual velocity, virtual m om ent, and  virtual work. H ere  the concep t 
rem ains close to its A risto telian  origin and  refers to entities tha t are n o t 
actually p resen t, b u t th a t have the poten tial to becom e real.
In  the d o m in an t discourse on VR the m eaning o f ‘virtual’ is generally 
o rien ted  towards the  optic conno ta tion  of the concept. Heim , for exam ple, 
defines VR as »an event o r entity  that is real in effect b u t n o t in fact«, and he 
adds: »T here is a sense in w hich any sim ulation makes som eth ing  seem  real 
tha t in fact is not. T he Virtuality game com bines head-tracking device, glove, 
an d  co m p u te r an im ation  to create the ‘effect’ on o u r senses o f ‘en titie s’ 
moving at us tha t a r e ‘n o tin  fact real’« (Heim 1993, 109-110). H eim ’s rem ark 
m akes clear th a t we can n o t conceive o f VR as a m ere illusion. The bodily 
an d  m en tal sensations we experience in a flight sim ulator can hardly  be 
d istingu ished  from  those experienced  du rin g  a real flight.7 Likewise, the 
virtual com m unities such as Alphaworld tha t are currently  em erging on  the 
In te rn e t, are  real com m unities in the sense that they enab le the inhabitants 
to com m une an d  to com m unicate (Watson 1997). Loving or hating som eone 
in VR is no  less real th an  loving o r hating  som eone in real life (RL). O f 
course one  m igh t ob ject th a t a love affair with an avatar, a virtual crash in a 
flight sim ulator o r a virtual m u rd er in a game like Dactyl Nightmare™, is quite 
d iffe ren t from  a real love affair, a real crash and  a real m urder. This is true, 
o f course. But it does n o t m ean that virtual world and com m unities are sheer 
fictions. T hey have a reality o f  their own. W hat distinguishes VR from  older 
form s o f rep resen ta tio n  such as pain ting  or film is th a t they n o t so m uch
7 It is often claim ed that VR is a disem bodied experience (see e.g. Rheingold 1991, 15- 
6). Heim  even claims that VR is a realisation of Plato’s dream to escape from the prison 
of the body: »Cyberspace is Platonism as a working product. The cybernaut seated 
before us, strapped  into sensory-input devices, appears to be, and is indeed, lost to 
this world. Suspended in com puter space, the cybernaut leaves the prison of the body 
and em erges in a world of digital sensation« (Heim 1993, 89). The example of the 
flight sim ulator already shows that this is not the case. Although it is true that the virtual 
body or avatar that we possess in a VR has an immaterial character, the very function 
of the VR equ ipm ent is to stim ulate the senses of our real body. In fact, the virtual 
em bodim ent is both  digital and material. According to Randall Walser, the essential 
difference and advantage of VR over film, plays and television is the very fact that, 
unlike the latter, cyberspace embodies (cited i n : \ Rheingold, 1991 #2147, 286). It is this 
em bodim ent tha t ensures tha t VR experiences do not just take place merely in the 
m ind, bu t are ‘felt’ as well (Cooper 1997,98). In this respect, VR experiences are real 
experiences.
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refer to a real world beyond the rep resen ta tion , b u t constitu te  a n o th e r  type 
o f Being-in-the-W orld. D escribing an d  analyzing these charac teris tics  o f  
Dasein s Being-in-a-virtual-World, as well as elucidating the way it is connected  
to Daseins Being-in-the-real-W orld, is the very task o f the  onto logy  o f  VR I 
am trying to break  the g ro u n d  for.8
P erhaps I can illum inate the con tou rs o f  this on to logy  a little m o re  by 
poin ting  at a striking similarity and  a n o  less strik ing d ifference betw een the 
ontology I am  aim ing at and  the deco n stru c tio n  o f rep resen ta tio n  by post­
structuralists such as Baudrillard, D errida and  Lyotard. T h e ir a rg u m en t tha t 
in postm odern  cu ltu re sign systems no  lo n g er re fe r to a reality, to a certa in  
ex ten t illum inates the virtuality o f  VR. W hen B audrillard  with reg ard  to the 
p resen t state of rep resen ta tio n  writes: »Sim ulation is no  lo n g er th a t o f  a 
territory, a referen tia l being  o r a substance. It is the g en e ra tio n  by m odels 
o f a real w ithout origin o r reality: a hyperreal« (B audrillard  1984, 253), th en  
I com pletely agree that VR is hyperreal in the sense th a t it is n o t (necessarily) 
referring  to an origin tha t precedes the sim ulated  w orld. However, this is 
n o t to say tha t it is w ithout reality. B audrillard  h ere , perh ap s m otivated  by 
a kind o f ontological nostalgia, seems to persist in  the h ierarch ically  valued 
opposition between reality and illusion that characterizes traditional ontology 
from  Plato on. Unlike B audrillard, we shou ld  n o t conceive o f  VR as a form  
o f d isappearance o f reality, b u t ra th e r  as a disclosure o f  another m o d e  o f  
reality. I th ink  faron Lanier, one o f the  fo u n d in g  fa thers o f VR, is aim ing  at 
this very issue when he calls VR a postsymbolic m ode o f com m unication . Sim on 
Perry rightly objects that L anier overlooks the fact tha t a teacup  in VR is still 
a representation (Penny 1994, 207-8), nevertheless he  does n o t get the  p o in t 
Lanier is trying to make: the fact th a t fo r Dasein in  cyberspace the  virtual 
teacup is n o t prim arily a rep resen ta tion  o f som eth ing  else, b u t a th in g  th a t 
is p art o f  his concernfully Being-in-a-vitual-World. W illiam W. A rm strong  
also seem s to  overlook this availableness ( Zuhandenheit) o f  v irtual beings 
w hen h e  argues in  his H e id eg g er in sp ire d  analysis o f  th e  re la tio n sh ip  
betw een Place and  Being in cyberspace: »It is tru e , the  co m p u te r functions 
as a location and as such has o p en ed  u p  a reg ion , a space if you will. But it 
is a space w here there are no  things, no  m ore locations to b e  o p en ed , no 
real relations to be opened  up and b ro u g h t forth  in a p resencing, b u t m erely
8 Of course in Being-in-a-virtual-World n o t only the world, b u t also the characteristics o f 
Dasein d iffe r from  those  o f Dasein th a t is in -a-real-w orld . E xam ples in c lu d e  
in d e te rm in a te  o r  a rb itra ry  physique , g e n d e r  a n d  e th n ic ity  m ag ica l pow ers, 
téléportation ability and the ability to reincarnate after a virtual death  (M acKinnon 
1997, 223f.). However, as already noticed, here I exclusively focus on the the im pact of 
VR on the worldliness of the world.
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im ages, th ough ts o f an d  references to locations left beh ind«  (A rm strong 
1994, 41).
In o rd e r to grasp m ore profoundly the virtuality o f Dasein s concernfully 
Being-in-a-virtual-W orld we should  take up the second m eaning  o f the word 
‘v irtu a l’ m en tio n ed  above, having the connotation  o f potentiality.0 In my 
concise exposition  o f H e id eg g er’s fundam ental ontology, I po in ted  to the 
fac t th a t  Dasein sh o u ld  n o t be  reg a rd ed  as an  o cc u ren t being , b u t as a 
Seinkönnen, a poten tiality  to be. We m ight say that in VR this potentiality  o f 
Dasein is tran sferred  in a radical way -  m ore radical th an  in everyday life -  
to the  beings it en co u n te rs  in its world. W ithin a virtual reality, beings are 
p rogram m able  accord ing  to a project by Dasein. O ne could  object here, that 
Dasein e n te r in g  a virtual w orld is n o t necessarily the p rog ram m er o f this 
world. This is true. It m ight be useful to distinguish between what, following 
a d istinction  m ade by M ichael Joyce with regard  to hypertext, we could  call 
exploratory a n d  constructive VR. (Joyce 1995, 39-59). In  th e  first case, fo r 
exam ple in  the  a fo rem en tio n ed  gam e Dactyl Nightmare™, we can navigate 
an d  in te rac t w ithin a virtual world, b u t only according to possibilities pre- 
established by the m akers. In  a constructive VR such as Alphaworld, however, 
Dasein becom es the p rogram m er o f his own world. H ere we see a rem arkable 
reversal o f the situation  in trad itional ontology. W hereas in this ontology 
(h u m an ) Being was conceived o f as if it were an occuren t being, now beings 
are conceived o f  as if they have a projective character.10 This is n o t only true 
fo r beings p ro g ram m ed  w ithin VR, b u t it also affects the Being o f natu ra l 
beings. T hese also increasingly becom e seen as program m able entities. In 
genetic  m an ip u la tio n , fo r exam ple, living organism s are conceived o f as 
p ro g ra m m a b le  e n ti t ie s  as w ell. W h ereas  m ech a n is tic  tech n o lo g y , as 
d esc ribed  by the la te r  H eidegger, is characterized  by con tro l and  use o f 
beings, inform ationistic technology even intervenes in the creation o f beings. 
In  tra n s fo rm s  th e  w o rld  in to  a fie ld  o f  v irtu a l p o ssib ilitie s  (D e M ul 
fo rth co m in g ).
Does this m ean th a t VR is the u ltim ate climax o f m odernistic will to 
contro l?  In a sense it is. VR, as a com puter generated  environm ent, literally 
is the u ltim ate  ou tcom e o f  m o d ern  calculative thinking. C hester therefo re
,J Mark Nunes, referring to Bergson, also points at this connotation in his analysis o f the 
virtuality o f the In ternet: »We may need to rethink the virtual no t in the commercial 
sense of ‘m ore real than rea l’, bu t in Bergson’s sense: the condition of possibility that 
occurs the m om ent before the em ergence of the actual« (Nunes 1997, 175).
1(1 The developm ent o f artificial intelligence and artificial life will perhaps lead to the 
po in t where non-hum an beings really will have a projective status -  intentionality -  
themselves (cf. O kren t 1996; Penny 1995).
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is justified  in claim ing that digital dom ains are the u ltim ate  expression  o f  
m odern  technology’s tendency to m ake the  real available as standing reserve 
(C hester 1997). However, we should  n o t fo rget th a t Dasein in  cyberspace is 
n o t a Fichtean-like absolute I th a t creates an d  contro ls his w orld. T h o u g h  
the virtual body may have superhum an  powers, as long  as Dasein ’s real body 
is part o f the material world, it remains a thrown, and  therefo re  finite B eing.11 
M oreover, Dasein is also always a lread y  th ro w n  in th e  v irtu a l w orlds it 
inhabits. This implies tha t the projects o f Dasein in these worlds a re  n o  less 
con fron ted  with all kinds o f opposition  o f h u m an  an d  n o n -h u m an  o th e r  
beings th a n  in o ff lin e  reality. N o t on ly  b ecau se  VR is a s h a re d  w orld  
constitu ted  by a m ultitude o f often  opposing  projects, b u t also because the 
p rogram m ed worlds get their own w eight an d  own sorts o f  ch an ce  an d  fate. 
A nd the  m o re  fu n d am en ta lly  Dasein in te rv en es  in  his w orld , th e  m o re  
fundam en tal is the chance tha t co n fro n ts  him . Dasein rem ains a th row n 
p ro jec t (geworfenes Entw urf), how ever th e  em phasis has c h a n g ed  from  a 
thrown p ro jec t to a throw n project}2
However, this nuance does n o t co n trad ic t the fact th a t this transfo r­
m a tio n  is a rad ic a l o n e . V ilem  F lu sse r s ta te s  th a t  w ith  in fo rm a t io n  
technologies »we begin  to liberate ourselves from  th e  tyranny o f  an  alleged 
reality. T he slavish attitude, with which we, as a subject, ap p ro ach  objective 
reality in o rd e r to m aster it, has to give in  to a new  a ttitu d e , in  w hich we 
in te rv e n e  in  the  fields o f  p o ssib ilities  in- a n d  o u ts id e  us, in  o rd e r  to  
in ten tionally  realize som e o f these possibilities. From  this perspective, the 
new  tech n o lo g y  m ean s th a t we a re  s ta r t in g  to  ra ise  o u rse lv es  fro m  a 
subjectivity into a projectivity. We are  facing a second  b irth  o f m ank ind , a 
second homo erectus. And this homo erectus, who plays with chance, in  o rd e r 
to in ten tio n a lly  transfo rm  it in to  necessity , m ay b e  ca lled  homo ludens« 
(Flusser 1992a, 25).
11 A nother im portant characteristic of inform ationistic technology, which I cannot deal 
with here, is that man becomes its ultimate raw material (cf. Heidegger 1967). Electronic 
implants and genetic engineering have begun to transform  m an into a transhum an or 
even posthuman being, whose ontological structure may be quite different from  hum an 
Dasein (cf. Moravec 1988).
121 would like to thank Awee Prins for this form ulation, as well for various o th e r useful 
com ments on  an earlier draft of this paper.
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Art
As play an d  a r t  are closely connected  (cf. G adam er 1986, 107-174), 
F lusser’s s ta tem en t brings m e to the last p a rt o f  my paper, in which I will 
com e back  to the  question  raised in the in troduction: the  im plications of 
VR fo r the  arts. How do  artworks tha t m ake use o f VR technology disclose 
W orld?
In  o rd e r to answer this question we have to keep in m ind that traditional 
aesthetics is strongly in fluenced  by the ontological trad ition  criticized by 
H eidegger. In the Platonist tradition  art was primarily conceived o f as a form  
o f mimesis o f  a second  o rder. W hereas Being was conceived as a collection 
o f  h ig h est timeless beings (the Ideas), and the beings in the em pirical world 
as im perfec t copies o f  these ideas, the work o f a rt »stands at th ird  rem ove 
from  reality«, thus offering »images far removed from the truth« (Plato 1974, 
597e-605b). However, within the Platonic tradition a gradual transform ation 
o f the m im etic conception  of art took place. In  the work o f Plotinus (Enneads, 
V, viii, 1), fo r exam ple , it is claim ed tha t works o f a r t are n o t so m uch a 
rep resen ta tio n  o f n a tu ra l objects, bu t an im m ediate rep resen ta tion  o f the 
Ideas them selves. C onsequently , the artist was no longer conceived o f as an 
in fe rio r craftsm an, b u t as a person  whose activities m ight be com pared  to 
those o f  the  p h ilo so p h er. From  the Renaissance on, the  artist has been  
increasingly a ttrib u ted  godlike qualities. L eonardo da Vinci, for exam ple, 
self-confidently claim ed tha t the artist in his work re-creates the living work of 
G o d . In  th e  m o d e rn ,  s e c u la r is e d  w orld , esp ec ia lly  fro m  th e  age o f  
R om anticism  on, the artist even took the place left by G od as an  o rig inato r 
o f  en tire ly  new  worlds (De M ul 1999a). This developm ent is obvious in the 
d ev e lo p m en t o f m o d e rn  art, which shows a transform ation  from  mimesis, 
w hich is still d o m in an t in  im pressionism , to poiesis. In the various avant- 
garde m ovem ents in tw entieth-century art this resulted in a com plete break 
with mimesis an d  realism . By m eans o f artistic techniques such as m ontage, 
m o d ern  a rt »does n o t rep roduce  the real, bu t constructs an object (its lexical 
field  includes the  term s ‘assem ble, build, jo in , unite, add, com bine, link, 
co n s tru c t, o rg an ise  [ . . . ] )  o r  ra th e r, m ounts a process [...]  in  o rd e r  to 
in tervene in the w orld, n o t to reflect b u t to change reality« (U lm er, 1983, 
86). A lthough  H eidegger has criticised the m anifest an th ropocen trism  and 
subjectivism in m o d ern  aesthetics, his conception o f a rt as developed in The 
Origin o f A rt show s an  e ssen tia l affin ity  w ith this ro m a n tic -m o d e rn is t 
co n cep tio n  o f art. A lthough h e  puts the role o f the artist in  perspective, in 
his descrip tion  o f the  G reek  tem ple we saw that for him  too the work o f  art 
does n o t portray  a w orld, b u t founds one.
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Seen from this perspective we may say th a t so far VR is th e  u ltim ate  
ou tcom e o f this developm ent, because in  VR w orlds a re  o rig in a ted  th a t 
g a th er p eo p le  an d  offer them  a p lace to live in. Especially in constructive 
VR, this technology realizes an im p o rtan t motive o f the  artistic avantgardes 
to transform  the observer of the work in to  a partic ipant. W hereas even m ost 
m odern  works o f a rt rem ain  o ccu ren t beings in the  sense th a t they are the 
fixation o f a projection, in constructive VR the  observer really partic ipates 
in the  fo u n d in g  o f W orld. Such v irtual w orlds a re  th e  Gesamtkunstwerke 
W agner was dream ing abou t (cf. H eim  1993, 124f.).
C o n sid e red  from  this pe rsp ec tiv e , th e  d e v e lo p m e n t o f  a r t  in  th e  
tw entieth century shows a rem arkable sim ilarity with re c e n t developm ents 
in the sciences. Inform ation  technology based  sciences such as artificial life 
also reflect a transform ation from  mimesis to poiesis. As Claus E m m eche states 
it in  his m onography on  artificial life: »Artificial life m ust be  seen as a sign 
o f the em ergence o f a new set of postm odern  sciences, p o stm o d ern  because 
they have renounced  o r strongly dow ngraded  the challenge o f providing us 
with a tru thful image of one real world, and  instead have taken on the mission 
o f exploring  the possibilities and  im possibilities o f virtual worlds. I t is a case 
o f m odal sciences, passing freely betw een necessity and  possibility. Science 
becom es the  art o f the  possible because the  in te restin g  questions are  n o  
longer how the world is, bu t how it could  be, an d  how we can m ost effectively 
create o th e r universes -  given this o r th a t set o f  co m p u ta tio n al resources« 
(Em m eche 1991). Conversely, one m ig h ta rg u e  th a t a rt becom es ascien tific  
p ro ject: »W hen we adm it th a t sc ience is a fo rm  o f  a rt, th e n  we d o  n o t 
hum iliate science, on the contrary, it becom es the paradigm  fo r all o th e r  
arts. It becomes clear that all kinds o f art only becom e reality, tha t is: p roduce 
their realities, when they strip off their em pirical skin an d  com e close to  the  
theoretical exactness o f science. [...]  Because o f digitalization, all form s o f 
art becom e exact scientific disciplines an d  can no  lo n g er be d istingu ished  
from  science« (Flusser 1992b, 29-30).
As suggested in my in troduction , VR in this sense in d eed  reun ites a rt 
and  technology which, since G reek cu ltu re , have gone th e ir separate  ways. 
H ere, I will n o t discuss the question as to w hether the developm ent described 
should  be considered an advantage o r not. My aim  has b ee n  to throw  som e 
light on this developm ent from  a philosophical perspective. Before we can 
ju d g e  the desirability o f Being-in-a-virtual-World, we first have to u n d erstan d  
th e  p h e n o m e n o n . O n to lo g ies , o f  co u rse , always have d e -o n to lo g ic a l 
im plications. But in ou r a ttem pt to e lucidate  these im plications, we have to 
try to avoid bo th  uncritical em bracing and  pessimistic re jection  o f VR. VR is 
n e ith e r a holy grail n o r »an assault on  reality« (Slouka 1995). This is n o t to
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say, how ever, th a t  VR is a n eu tra l technology. Like all technologies, VR 
discloses the  w orld in  its own way and  as such it offers us a whole range o f 
new  possibilities a n d  new  dangers, pleasures u n d re am ed  o f befo re and  
frustra tions u n fo reseen  even in ou r futuristic nightm ares. We m ight also 
ex p ect th a t som e o f the  greatest art in the nex t century will be based on VR 
technology, and  th a t a t the same time this technology will be used for the 
m ost stultifying kitsch. We can only hope that our philosophical reflections 
on this technology will he lp  us to distinguish between the two.
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